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COMPARING FUNDAMENTALISMS: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY APPROACH

David Romney

The last forty years have witnessed the emergence of a number of Islamist and Jewish
fundamentalist groups, resulting in a number of comparative studies that try to explain this
phenomenon (e.g. Antoun and Hegland 1987; Sivan and Friedman 1990). Although scholars
have argued varying reasons for this recent religious resurgence, most have recognized the
importance of the 1967 war to both Jewish and Islamist fundamentalist movements. Some of
these scholars see the religious resurgence following this war as a continuation of religious
sentiments expressed by pre-1967 Zionist and fundamentalist Islamic groups rather than as a new
movement (Davis 1987, 149–152). Others, while stressing the importance of previous Islamic
revivalism, note that the 1967 war marked a turning point for both Islamist and Jewish groups
(Esposito 2005, 160-65), and yet some see global trends that unite not just Islamist and Jewish
fundamentalist groups but all fundamentalist groups (Keddie 1998). Others take a different tack,
claiming that Islamic and Jewish fundamentalist movements are actually quite different from
each other and only superficially mirror each other; for instance, Hunter asserts that Jewish
fundamentalism focuses more than Islamic fundamentalism on the possibility of future failures
and the importance of preventing these failures rather than on past grievances or experiences
(1993, 31-32). However, in spite of this research, two basic questions about Islamism and Jewish
fundamentalism remain unanswered: (1) what effect has the 1967 war had on the Islamist and
Jewish fundamentalist movements and (2) do these movements mirror each other, or have they
developed independent of one another?
Using a social movement theory (SMT) approach, I will argue that post-1967 Jewish and
Islamic fundamentalist movements mirror each other in a number of crucial ways. According to
SMT, individual political desires are translated into group-based social movements through the
presence of appropriate social movement organizations (SMOs; Wiktorowicz 2004). As outlined
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by Robinson (2004), the presence and use of three factors can enhance the viability of an SMO:
changes in political opportunity structures, effective mobilizing structures, and correct cultural
framing. Robinson and Wiktorowicz have shown how Islamist activist groups can be analyzed
under a social movement theory framework, but aside from Munson (2008), no one has applied
this framework to explain Jewish activist groups. In this paper, I will show that post-1967
fundamentalist Jewish movements, like their Islamist counterparts, can be better understood
through SMT. By applying SMT, three things are made apparent: (1) the political opportunity
structures for both Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups changed as a result of the 1967
war, stimulating the appearance of new SMOs on both sides after this war; (2) the SMOs of both
sides have used similar mobilizing structures since the 1967 war; and (3) since the 1967 war, the
SMOs of both sides have used cultural framing to address three similar issues: unfaithful coreligionists, the status of the land of Palestine, and past failures or tragedies.
I will use a purposefully broad definition of fundamentalism for this study. For the
purposes of this paper, I define religious fundamentalist groups as those striving for religious
orthodoxy. Although this definition is not specific, it allows me to look broadly at different
fundamentalist movements. In this study, I will focus on examples from the fundamentalist
movements of Hamas, Gush Emunim, and Kach, all of which conform to this definition of
fundamentalism.
The 1967 Israeli war changed the political opportunity structures for Islamist and Jewish
fundamentalist movements. For this study, changes in political opportunity structures are defined
according to Robinson’s (2004, 123) definition: political changes that alter the opportunities
available for an SMO. For Islamist movements, the capture of the occupied territories in the
1967 war was such a change. The failure of the Arab forces in this war and Israel’s occupation of
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the Gaza strip and the West Bank led Palestinians to depend less on foreign sources of
organization for their nationalistic movements because foreign powers were forced to loosen
their hold on parts of Palestine. Up to the 1967 war, resistance against Israel by the Palestinians
consisted of fedayeen attacks from Egypt or other states; however, as a result of the 1967 war,
Israel began to occupy the areas that these attacks had been coming from (Tessler 1994, 399464). Israel was able to rid these areas of many fedayeen fighters, but they were unsuccessful at
getting rid of all of them. Over time, this neglect led to the emergence of many Palestinian
activist groups, now more effective because they were operating inside Israeli-controlled
territory.
For Jewish fundamentalist movements, the same event—the gain of territory after the
1967 war— changed political opportunity structures by allowing these movements to pursue
their goal of incorporating Judea and Samaria in the state of Israel. Some groups, particularly the
revisionist Zionists led by Jabotinsky, expressed early on their desire to bring all of historical
Palestine within the borders of the modern Israeli state. However, before the 1967 war, this goal
was impossible to achieve. There are two main reasons why the 1967 war changed this situation.
First, after the war, the ownership of Judea and Samaria was a reality, not a dream (at least as far
as the Israelis were concerned). Fulfilling these territorial desires was therefore a physical
possibility. Second, many secular and religious Jews supported territorial expansion immediately
following the 1967 war, not just fundamentalist groups. As Sprinzak outlines, immediately
following this war, Israeli politics was dominated by two camps: the maximalists (those who
advocated territorial expansion, believing that the occupied territories helped Israel better defend
itself) and the minimalists (those who believed that territorial compromise with the Arabs would
help better secure the state of Israel; 1999, 115-16). Some of these maximalists wanted to spur
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the settler movement into the West Bank for religious reasons; Kahane, who drew from
Jabotinsky’s ideology in explaining the religious justification for expansion, is perhaps the most
famous religious maximalist from this time period (191). However, other maximalists wanted to
expand for security reasons. They felt that gaining this territory would provide the state of Israel
with a buffer zone that would keep them safe from future attacks. This reasoning, although
opposed to the minimalists who could not ―ignore the implications of having become an
occupying power (Oz 1983, 133), attracted secular Jews as well as fundamentalists, and therefore
the settler movement had a broad support base. For these two reasons, territorial gains after the
1967 war changed the opportunities available to Jewish fundamentalist groups.
Since 1967, Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups have also used similar mobilizing
structures, defined as networks that enhance the ability of an SMO to recruit new members. In
the years following the 1967 war, a huge spike in mosque construction and the creation of almujamma’ al-Islami—an ―Islamic collective‖ that eventually oversaw 40 percent of the mosques
in Gaza strip as well as a university (Robinson 1997, 137)—formed an extensive mobilizing
structure that the Muslim Brotherhood and later Hamas used to recruit new members. As
outlined by Robinson, the 1973 establishment of the mujamma’ in the Gaza strip was in part a
response to the secular nationalism of the PLO and in part a result of changes following the 1967
war (136-47). Seeing the success that the PLO had achieved in mobilizing activists through
grassroots movements at Palestinian universities, the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza wanted
similar organizations that would promote nationalistic ideology with an Islamist tinge. Because
of the failure of secular governments in the 1967 war and increasing disatisfaction, the
mujamma’s message was in some ways more palatable to an increasingly religious society.
Evidences of this increasing religious fervor include: a double in the number of mosques in the
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Gaza strip, a rise in the popularity of religious literature, the establishment of a number of
Islamic universities for teaching Islamic law (136). It was these mosques that, according to AbuAmr, were the most important tool in recruiting (1993, 7-8). The Muslim Brotherhood, through
the mujamma’, also ran libraries, social clubs, and other social organizations that endeared the
population to Hamas. But it was in the mosques, protected from Israeli interference out of a
respect for religion, that they recruited members, disseminating their ideas after the daily prayer
services (8). By channeling the society’s religious fervor in a political direction, and by
organizing several institutions under the centralized al-mujamma’ al-islami, the Muslim
Brotherhood and later Hamas thus gained an audience for their message.
Similarly, after the 1967 war, the yeshivot in Israel played a crucial role in the formation
and the recruitment efforts of the Jewish fundamentalist group Gush Emunim. One yeshiva in
particular, Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav, has been important throughout Gush Emunim’s history. In
May 1967, just three weeks before the 1967 war, Rabbi Zvi Yehudah Kook powerfully declared
his frustration at the fact that the Jews did not yet hold all of Biblical Israel, stating, ―Where is
our Hebron—are we forgetting it? …Where is our Shechem? Are we forgetting it? And where is
our Jericho—are we forgetting it? And where is the eastern bank of the Jordan?‖ (Segev 2007,
181). When, after the war, Israel gained exactly the cities that Rabbi Kook mentioned in this
speech, many of his followers saw Israel’s victory as a miracle. Some of the students from the
Yeshiva, led by Rabbi Moshe Levinger, were inspired by this ―miracle‖ to found Kiryat Arba, a
settlement located just on the outskirts of Hebron. Kiryat Arba was the first settlement of what
would later be called the Gush Emunim movement. Although the Gush Emunim movement
would not be officially established until 1974, after the Yom Kippur war helped its movement
gain more steam, its roots are found in the reaction of Yeshivat Merkaz ha-Rav to the 1967 war.
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This yeshivah continued to be the primary means of recruitment as the movement
progressed, and other yeshivot also began to support Gush Emunim. Like al-mujamma’ alislami, the yeshivot combine both religious and social services into one institution. The students
there grow up together and spend time with the same teachers, developing social ties equivalent
to those developed in the social clubs and mosques of the mujamma’. Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook
took advantage of these close associations between students to encourage them to join the
settlements, forming the ideologically devoted core that the movement needed during this
formative stage (Sprinzak 1991, 125). During the period between the 1967 war and the formal
organization of Gush Emunim, other yeshivot began to join with providing support, particularly
the yeshivot of the Bnei Akiva movement. Even after 1974, when formal organizations were
created to help with recruitment, the youth of Merkaz ha-Rav still continued to play an important
role, inspiring others to join the movement (126).
Cultural framing, the last similarity between Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist
movements that I will address, is perhaps the most interesting of the three. In SMT, Cultural
framing is an assemblage of tools through which we interpret the world around us (Wiktorowicz
2004, 15). According to Robinson, these tools are most effective when condensed into a pithy
―bumper sticker‖ statement; statements like these allow potential members to easily understand
and either identify with or reject an SMO’s ideological leanings (Robinson 2004, 116-17). The
religious rhetoric that Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups used to address certain issues
conforms to this description. Particularly, after the 1967 war Islamist movements and Jewish
fundamentalist movements began to use similar cultural framing devices to when approaching
three topics: less faithful co-religionists, the status of the land of Palestine, and past failures or
tragedies.
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After 1967, fundamentalist groups on both sides increasingly demonized their less pious
co-religionists, accusing them of undermining their righteous plans. According to Esposito
(2005, 166), the issue of less faithful coreligionists is important for Islamist groups for two
reasons: (1) they believe that it is necessary to institute sharia law before a government is
considered legitimate and (2) they believe that jihad is incumbent upon all Muslims. In order for
these two goals to be accomplished, Muslims in these fundamentalist groups need the help of
other Muslims. For this reason, some of these groups have asserted that co-religionists who do
not support sharia law or jihad against unbelievers are the same as atheists or infidels. However,
unlike Jewish fundamentalists, those deemed ―infidels‖ are often government leaders rather than
those of another political party or leaning. For instance, Hamas has often criticized Fatah, the
main faction of the PLO, on these terms. Because Hamas criticized them with respect to an
increasingly popular religious viewpoint (as already outlined, Gazans were becoming
increasingly religious at this point in time), this term reverberated well with the population.
Jewish fundamentalist groups tended to demonize their less faithful co-religionists in a
similar manner. For Jewish fundamentalists, the issue of less faithful co-religionists was
important because they believed that immoral actions by secular Jews would delay the coming of
the Messiah. These fundamentalists also blamed the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict on
the seculars, thinking that removing the seculars would allow God to fulfill the promises made to
the Jews in the Hebrew Bible. A quote from Benjamin Ze’ev Kahane, son of Rabbi Meir
Kahane, illustrates the intensity with which those on the Jewish side expressed these convictions:
The problem is not the Arabs—the problem is the Jews. The truth, the way we look at it,
is that there has never been an Arab problem. We could have solved that problem in 48
hours, if only we wanted to. The real war is not with Arabs but with the Hellenized Jews.
All the blood shed by Arab terrorism is ―as if‖ shed by the Arabs; the people really
responsible for the bloodshed are Jews scared by the Gentiles and attached to distorted
Western ideas. (Sprinzak 1999, 264-65)
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Here, the outgroup being criticized is not, as is often the case, the Arabs; rather, it is secular
Jews, who are not dedicated to the ingroup’s idea of what it means to be a ―righteous‖ Jew, that
receive the criticism.
Similar sentiments are expressed by those who apply the term ―self-hating Jew‖ to others.
This term has a long history of use: Herzl used it to describe those opposed to Zionism; some
applied it to Jews in America, Germany, and other Western countries when the expansion of
Hitler’s power and the persecution of the Jews in other countries threatened Jews as a people;
and politicians have used it to describe those that oppose Israeli policy (Finlay 2005, 11-15).
Following the 1967 war, it has been used by Jewish fundamentalists to describe secular Jews,
and because of its long history and its relation to the holocaust, it has easily become one a
―bumper sticker‖ term. An example of this use of the term is found in a statement by Rabbi Meir
Kahane, a fundamentalist who in 1968 established the Jewish Defense League in the wake of the
1967 war. He used this term to describe Jewish leftists when he wrote that Israel is ―crawling
with… Hebrew speaking goyim [non-Jews] whose self hate… drives them to reject Judaism‖
(Paine 1994, 13). More recently, Ariel Sharon has used this term to describe the left when the
Oslo peace process threatened the settler movement to the West Bank, saying, ―Terrible self-hate
engulfs us… Our leaders talk to Arafat about disarming Jews and dismantling Jewish
settlements‖ (Finlay 2005, 15). Using this term helps other like-minded Jews to quickly identify
with fundamentalists in a positive light. Therefore, both Jewish and Islamist fundamentalist
groups used pejoratives as a cultural frame to attract new members who were opposed less
faithful co-religionists.
After the 1967 war, both Islamists and Jewish fundamentalists also began to use cultural
frames when discussing the land of Israel or Palestine. Before the 1967 war, Palestinian claims to
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the land of Palestine were based on previous land ownership. This still is the main reason that
Palestinians want to return to Palestinian; many even still keep the keys to the homes they had to
leave after the 1948 war, a symbolic reminder of their ownership rights. However, after the
territorial gains by Israel during the 1967 war caused Islamic soul searching and increased
religiosity, Hamas began to emphasize that all of Israel belonged to the Muslims by religious
mandate. They did this by using a well known Islamic concept, the waqf—a religious
endowment, usually consisting of property or buildings, given by Muslims to the community.
Giving ones land as a waqf is equivalent to donating it to God. After the 1967 war, Hamas began
to declare that ―Palestine is a waqf,‖ a unique application of this religious term (Robinson 2004,
130-31). Although using this term in this manner is historically inaccurate, it was still effective
insofar that it helped add a religious flavor to the traditional Palestinian right of return.
Similarly, Jewish fundamentalist groups have used religious cultural frames when
discussing the occupied territories. They did this by using biblical names and stories in their
attempts to get people to move into settlements. For instance, the leaders of Gush Emunim and
the leaders of other fundamentalist groups call the West Bank by its biblical names, Judea and
Samaria. Also, present day ads for the settlements often make reference to famous stories from
the Bible, implying that the settlers are a continuation of a holy tradition. Since these groups and
other like-minded people considered the victory in the 1967 war a miracle, using Biblical names
like these remind potential members of this spiritual nature of the 1967 victory, thereby framing
the current settler movement in a similar manner.
Lastly, Islamists and Jewish fundamentalists have both used cultural frames when
addressing how to overcome past failures or tragedies. For many Arabs, their loss in the 1967
war marked their biggest failure in recent history. According to Esposito, many Islamists blame
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recent Muslim failures, including the loss in 1967, on a decline in religiosity (2005, 160-162).
Therefore, religious frames during this time period were effective for reaching out to those
disaffected with the status quo. For Islamists, and particularly Hamas, the greatest such frame
has been that ―Islam is the solution.‖ Robinson cites this slogan as the most popular slogan
among modern Islamist movements in the Middle East, noting that this specific phrase and its
sentiments appear in Hamas’s 1988 charter (2004, 130-31). Again, using a religious cultural
frame proves useful in attracting new members.
Jewish fundamentalist groups, on the other hand, have used the slogan ―never again‖
when addressing this issue. This is perhaps their most effective frame, since the holocaust left
such a large impact on Israel. This term was not used only after 1967; it was actually popularized
after the 1948 war as a deliberate attempt by the government to wipe away the image of the
―holocaust Jew‖ (Almog 2000). Because these efforts by the government still affect Jewish
perceptions today, this frame resonates particularly well with potential members. For this reason,
Kahane used this phrase as the title of one of his books, which outlined the need for American
Jews to rise up against those fighting the state of Israel rather than being passive in this fight
(1971).
Looking at these examples, we see that SMT is particularly useful for evaluating Jewish
fundamentalist movements. By applying SMT in this study, we also see that Jewish
fundamentalist movements are quite similar to Islamist fundamentalist movements. Lastly,
through application of SMT, we see that there is a common explanation for the recent
resurgence, namely that changes in political opportunity structures, an effective use of
mobilizing structures, and a correct use of cultural frames since the 1967 war have together
caused the recent increase in the number of Islamist and Jewish fundamentalist groups.
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Why the Two-state Solution isn’t Working
David Romney and Basseem Hallac
The Arab-Israeli peace process has hit another dead end, and as usual, bickering
over settlements is the reason why. After a fruitless ten-month settlement freeze, Israeli
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reopened construction this last September to
appease Israeli settlers. Since then, negotiations with the US have opened the door for a
second freeze, but settlers have been pressuring fundamentalist parties in Netanyahu’s
coalition to prevent it. Strong opposition like this leads Americans to believe that ArabIsraeli conflict is insoluble, but the truth is more complex. Certain issues, such as
deciding who controls Jerusalem and whether or not Palestinian refugees should return to
their homeland, really are divisive. However, most Israelis and Palestinians support a
two-state solution, and many Israelis are willing to concede some settlements for peace.
If this is really the case, then how do minority fundamentalist parties prevent concessions
that most Israelis support? The answer lies in Israel’s electoral system. This system,
combined with increasing political factionalization over the last decade, allows
fundamentalist parties to kill the two-state solution.
Israel’s electoral system, a proportional representation (PR) system, is a problem
because its low electoral threshold allows radical parties to emerge. America’s electoral
system tends to produce two parties that converge ideologically in the center; PR
systems, on the other hand, tend to produce multiple parties that diverge ideologically,
allowing smaller, more radical groups to take gain a political voice. Governments
concerned with this tendency often establish electoral thresholds—most ranging from 3%
to 10%—that make it difficult for these groups to gain power. Although Israel should
arguably be concerned with radical parties, Israel’s electoral system has an unusually low
threshold. Originally at 1%, its threshold has risen to 2% since 2003. This is a step in the
right direction, but it’s still too small to prevent the emergence of fundamentalist parties.
These parties wouldn’t prevent peace if they never ended up on a majority
coalition. However, they often do because of competition between the mainstream
parties, Likud, Kadima, and Labor. Getting these parties to cooperate is like trying to get
Democrats and Republicans to cooperate on healthcare reform. Although they will ally
out of necessity, the winning party would rather form a coalition with an outlier than with
the ―enemy.‖ For instance, after the 2009 parliamentary elections, Netanyahu’s Likud
tried to form a coalition with Kadima. However, its leader Tzipi Livni refused to join
with fundamentalist groups in Netanyahu’s coalition, stating that Netanyahu either ―goes
with the Right or with us.‖ So Netanyahu chose the Right, even though Likud and
Kadima would have been just five seats short of a parliamentary majority. In the end, the
result is a coalition government that contains fundamentalist groups and does not reflect
Israeli majority opinion.
In addition, changes in public opinion over the last decade have amplified these
problems. Although most Israelis agree on several important issues—for instance, the
two-state solution—data from recent Israeli parliamentary elections shows that they are
becoming politically factionalized. Before 1996, most voters cast their ballots for just one
or two major parties, and the largest party in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, always
controlled 40–56 seats. Because the Knesset has 120 seats, this means that the largest
party always controlled 33%–46% by itself. But since 1996, the largest parties have each

controlled only 26–38 seats, or 22%–32%. Given that Israel’s electoral system guarantees
polarization, these recent changes in public opinion don’t bode well for the viability of
future peace attempts.
Since Israel’s electoral system is contributing to the growth of the settler
movement and the failure of peace processes, changes should be instituted quickly so that
fundamentalist minorities don’t frustrate majority-supported peace efforts. If not, the
Arab-Israeli conflict could soon become truly insoluble.
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HaOlam HaZeh -1Koah
0.01
Hadash
7E-05
Maki
1 0.01 7E-05

Eleventh government
Same parties as above

7th Knesset ('69)
0.7882 Alignment
56
4.721 Gahal
26
0.625 National Religious
12 Party
Agudat Yisrael 4
Independent Liberals
4
National List
4
Rakah
3
Progress and Development
2
Poalei Agudat Yisrael
2
Cooperation and 2Brotherhood
HaOlam HaZeh -2Koah Hadash
Free Centre
2
Maki
1

Gahal and Rafi joined w/ Six-Day war to form NUG
Fourteenth government
Gahal
National Religious Party
The Independent Liberals
Progress and Development
Cooperation and Brotherhood
Merger of Mapam and Rafi into alignment

Twelfth government
Same parties as above
Herut and Liberal party combine into Gahal

0.467
0.217
0.1
0.033
0.033
0.033
0.025
0.017
0.017
0.017
0.017
0.017
0.008

8th Knesset ('73)
0.218 0.71986 Alignment
51 0.43 0.181 0.7018
0.047 3.5697 Likud
39 0.33 0.106 3.3535
0.01
0.85 National Religious
10 Party
0.08 0.007 0.5417
0.001
Religious Torah Front
5 0.04 0.002
0.001
Independent Liberals
4 0.03 0.001
0.001
Rakah
4 0.03 0.001
6E-04
Ratz
3 0.03 6E-04
3E-04
Progress and Development
2 0.02 3E-04
3E-04
Moked
1 0.01 7E-05
3E-04
Arab List for Bedouin
1 0.01
and Villagers
7E-05
3E-04
3E-04
7E-05

Seventeenth government
Alignment
Ratz
Independent Liberals
Progress and Development
Arab List for Bedouins and Villagers
NRP joined later and Ratz left

9th Knesset ('77)
Likud
43 0.36
Alignment
32 0.27
Dash
15 0.13
National Religious
12 Party
0.1
Hadash
5 0.04
Agudat Yisrael 4 0.03
Flatto-Sharon 1 0.01
Shlomtzion
2 0.02
Left Camp of Israel
2 0.02
United Arab List1 0.01
Poalei Agudat Yisrael
1 0.01
Ratz
1 0.01
Independent Liberals
1 0.01

10th Knesset ('81)
0.128 0.7711 Likud
48
0.4
0.071 4.3689 Alignment
47 0.39
0.016 0.5083 National Religious6Party
0.05
0.01
Agudat Yisrael
4 0.03
0.002
Hadash
4 0.03
0.001
Tehiya
3 0.03
7E-05
Tami
3 0.03
3E-04
Telem
2 0.02
3E-04
Shinui
2 0.02
7E-05
Ratz
1 0.01
7E-05
7E-05
7E-05

Dash joined later b/f fell apart

Twentieth government
Same parties

0.16
0.153
0.003
0.001
0.001
6E-04
6E-04
3E-04
3E-04
7E-05

11th Knesset ('84)
12th Knesset ('88)
0.68 Alignment
44 0.37 0.134 0.74 Likud
40 0.33 0.111 0.772
3.125 Likud
41 0.34 0.117 3.86 Alignment
39 0.33 0.106 4.38
0.55 Tehiya
5 0.04 0.002 0.84 Shas
6 0.05 0.003 0.808
National Religious4Party
0.03 0.001
Agudat Yisrael
5 0.04 0.002
Hadash
4 0.03 0.001
Ratz
5 0.04 0.002
Shas
4 0.03 0.001
National Religious5Party
0.04 0.002
Shinui
3 0.03 6E-04
Hadash
4 0.03 0.001
Ratz
3 0.03 6E-04
Tehiya
3 0.03 6E-04
Yahad
3 0.03 6E-04
Mapam
3 0.03 6E-04
Progressive List for
2 Peace
0.02 3E-04
Tzomet
2 0.02 3E-04
Agudat Yisrael
2 0.02 3E-04
Moledet
2 0.02 3E-04
Morasha
2 0.02 3E-04
Shinui
2 0.02 3E-04
Tami
1 0.01 7E-05
Degel HaTorah
2 0.02 3E-04
Kach
1 0.01 7E-05
Progressive List for
1 Peace
0.01 7E-05
Ometz
1 0.01 7E-05
Arab Democratic Party
1 0.01 7E-05
Look more closely at this period - post '82 paralysis
Unified block of religious and secular maximalists, not many minimalists now
Twenty-second government
Twenty-fourth government
Likud
Likud
Alignment
National Religious Party
National Religious Party
Shas
Agudat Yisrael
Agudat Yisrael
Shas
Degel HaTorah
Shinui
New Liberal Party
Ometz
Tehiya
Tzomet
Shinui later leaves
Moledet
Unity for Peace and Immigration
Geulat Yisrael

13th Knesset ('92)
Labor Party
44 0.37 0.134
Likud
32 0.27 0.071
Meretz
12
0.1
0.01
Tzomet
8 0.07 0.004
National Religious 6Party
0.05 0.003
Shas
6 0.05 0.003
United Torah Judaism
4 0.03 0.001
Hadash
3 0.03 6E-04
Moledet
3 0.03 6E-04
Arab Democratic Party
2 0.02 3E-04

Support from Hadash and Arab Democratic Party
Shas leaves
Yi'ud joins (broke away from Tzomet)

Twenty-sixth government
Labor
Meretz
Yi'ud

14th Knesset ('96)
15th Knesset ('99)
16th Knesset ('03)
0.772 Labor Party
34 0.28
0.08 0.822 One Israel
26 0.22 0.047 0.887 Likud
38 0.32
0.1 0.838
4.393 Likud-Gesher-Tzomet
32 0.27 0.071 5.61 Likud
19 0.16 0.025 8.81 Labor-Meimad 19 0.16 0.025 6.17
0.517 Shas
10 0.08 0.007 0.55 Shas
17 0.14
0.02 0.625 Shinui
15 0.13 0.016 0.567
National Religious9Party
0.08 0.006
Meretz
10 0.08 0.007
Shas
11 0.09 0.008
Meretz
9 0.08 0.006
Yisrael BaAliyah 6 0.05 0.003
National Union
7 0.06 0.003
Yisrael BaAliyah 7 0.06 0.003
Shinui
6 0.05 0.003
Meretz-Yachad and
6 the
0.05
Democratic
0.003 Choice
Hadash-Balad
5 0.04 0.002
Centre Party
6 0.05 0.003
National Religious6Party
0.05 0.003
United Torah Judaism
4 0.03 0.001
National Religious5Party
0.04 0.002
United Torah Judaism
5 0.04 0.002
The Third Way
4 0.03 0.001
United Torah Judaism
5 0.04 0.002
Hadash-Ta'al
3 0.03 6E-04
United Arab List 4 0.03 0.001
United Arab List 5 0.04 0.002
One Nation
3 0.03 6E-04
Moledet
2 0.02 3E-04
National Union
4 0.03 0.001
Balad
3 0.03 6E-04
Hadash
3 0.03 6E-04
Yisrael BaAliyah 2 0.02 3E-04
Yisrael Beiteinu 4
United Arab List 2 0.02 3E-04
Balad
2
One Nation
2

nd Arab Democratic Party

from Tzomet)

Twenty-ninth government
Likud
Labor-Meimad
Shas
Centre Party
National Religious Party
United Torah Judaism
Yisrael BaAliyah
National Union-Yisrael Beiteinu

National Union leaves
National Religious Party leaves
Shinui leaves
Labor-Meimad joins
Agudat joins
Labor-Meimad leaves
Kadima formed and becomes leader
Likud leaves

17th Knesset ('06)
18th Knesset ('09)
Kadima
29 0.24 0.058 0.873 Kadima
28 0.23
Labor-Meimad 19 0.16 0.025 7.843 Likud
27 0.23
Shas
12
0.1
0.01 0.558 Yisrael Beiteinu 15 0.13
Likud
12
0.1
0.01
Labor Party
13 0.11
Yisrael Beiteinu 11 0.09 0.008
Shas
11 0.09
National Union-National
9 0.08Religious
0.006 Party United Torah Judaism
5 0.04
Gil
7 0.06 0.003
United Arab List-Ta'al
4 0.03
United Torah Judaism
6 0.05 0.003
National Union
4 0.03
Meretz-Yachad
5 0.04 0.002
Hadash
4 0.03
United Arab List-Ta'al
4 0.03 0.001
New Movement-Meretz
3 0.03
Hadash
3 0.03 6E-04
The Jewish Home 3 0.03
Balad
3 0.03 6E-04
Balad
3 0.03

1949
1951
1955
1959
1961
1965
1969
1973
1977
1981
1984
1988
1992
1996
1999
2003
2006
2009

0.054 0.852
0.051 6.77
0.016 0.617
0.012
0.008
0.002
0.001
0.001
0.001
6E-04
6E-04
6E-04

4.73372781
5.04908836
5.99500416
4.9213944
5.36512668
4.72131148
3.56965791
3.35351653
4.36893204
3.125
3.8585209
4.38489647
4.39292251
5.60747664
8.8127295
6.17495712
7.84313725
6.76691729

Yisrael Beiteinu joins
Yisrael Beiteinu leaves

Electoral rules and the size of the prize
Allen Hicken
Orit Kedar
Measure of political fractionalization

Truman center at Hebrew University
Taubman center
Sammy Smooha - polls
Outline the theory

Read about what effects the effective number of parties

0.78875
0.80194444
0.83319444
0.79680556
0.81361111
0.78819444
0.71986111
0.70180556
0.77111111
0.68
0.74083333
0.77194444
0.77236111
0.82166667
0.88652778
0.83805556
0.8725
0.85222222

61%
53%
67%
72%
58%
63%
85%
54%
51%
55%
84%
81%
52%
55%
63%
57%
56%
62%

Coefficient
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
1940
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1960

1980

2000

2020

Effective parties
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
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Effective parties

1960

1980

2000

2020
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fective number of parties

80%
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60%
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Report for David Romney
Use of Library Resources
The library’s greatest research sources for me were its books and the online databases
available through the library. I found these sources generally useful. I only once had difficulty
finding a book, and the online databases always contained the articles that I needed. I did not use
the library staff very often; I never had any difficulty finding the sources that I needed. I also did
not coordinate with Brian Champion, the librarian whom I submitted my research application
through; working with my mentoring professor was easier.
What I learned
I have taken three main lessons from my experience. First, I have learned that the subject
of a research paper can turn out, in the end, to be far different than what you intend in the
beginning. My subject actually changed a couple of times, allowing me to publish twice from my
research. Second, I have learned to keep my schedule flexible. Changes in my subject, as well as
other matters, necessitated adapting my schedule. Third, I have learned what a great help and
friend professors can be, both within the research process and in other ways. Professor Gubler
met regularly with me to discuss the progress of my research. Because of my involvement with
him in this research project, he also gave me a position as a research assistant and has written
further letters of recommendation for me. These three lessons will help me with future
endeavors.
Publishing
I published twice as a result of my research. My first publication was in BYU Political
Review. Although not a research paper, preparing my article for this publication took much
research. This first article focuses on the effects of Israel’s unique electoral system on the peace

process. After completing this article, I switched my focus to Jewish fundamentalism in Israel, in
which I had found myself becoming more interested as I went along. I used this research to write
an article for Sigma, a BYU political science journal. Writing this article involved more research
than the first did, especially in outlining my theoretical framework for the paper. After
submitting this article to Sigma, my interested turned to fractionalization in Israel’s electoral
system. I constructed a data set from my preliminary research, and I want to write an article
about changes in the number of effective parties—a political science measurement of political
fractionalization—over time.
Funding
This research grant greatly helped me complete my research. Without it, I would not have
been able to devote the time necessary to prepare an article for publication. I greatly appreciate
the generosity of the library in giving me this grant.

